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I INTRODUCTION 
"Public sentiment notwithstanding, a number of commentators have 
speculated that a ew Zealand republic is inevitable ... " 1 The move towards 
republicanism may not yet have gained momentum in New Zealand, but it 
seems clear that at some point its time will come. In the ongoing discussion 
regarding New Zealand's constitutional arrangements, the issue of 
republicanism must be addressed. In this regard, two questions need to be 
addressed: should New Zealand become a republic? and what form should a 
New Zealand republic take? This paper addresses the second of those two 
questions. Harris suggests "the prevailing view is that a President, who would 
not only step into the shoes of the Monarch, but would also assume all the 
powers of the Governor-General, should replace the Monarch".2 
In discussing the form that a New Zealand Republic should take, it is 
necessary to consider the form and role of the Head of State. Currently, the 
Head of State in New Zealand is the Sovereign, with the Governor-General as 
the Sovereign's representative in New Zealand, but in a republic, that role 
would have to take a new form. 
The Constitution of Ireland (Bunreacht na hEireann) continues the 
system of Cabinet Government handed down from England, with a President 
in the place of the Monarch as the Head of State.3 In 1995, Philip Shannon 
suggested: "the Republic of Ireland provides a model for a republican system 
of government that could be conceivably be adopted for use in New 
Zealand".4 He argued: 5 
The basis for choosing the Irish Republic is that it is a nation with a 
Westminster style executive government. In addition, it has a non-
1 oel Cox and Raymond Miller "Monarchy" in Raymond Miller (ed) New Zealand Government and 
Politics (3 ed, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2003) 50. 
2 V Harris "The Constitutional Future of New Zealand" [2004] NZLR 269, 299-300. 
3 Although the Constitution does not anywhere specifically state that the President is the Head of State, 
it is generally accepted that is what the position represents. 
4 Philip J Shannon "Becoming a Republic - Law Reform Options for New Zealand" LLM Research 
Paper, VUW, 1995, 35. 
5 Shannon, above n 4, 32. 
3 
executive president who fulfils a similar role to the New Zealand 
Governor-General. 
The Irish model is indeed useful to consider because of these 
similarities. However, it seems necessary to further consider the Irish model of 
the Head of State to assess its suitability for ew Zealand. Constitutions are, 
by their nature, products of the society in which they are developed. New 
Zealand and Ireland, while sharing some similarities, have their own unique 
political and social environments. This paper examines the Irish presidential 
model and the current role of the Governor-General in New Zealand and 
considers the suitability of such a model for New Zealand. 
II SOCIAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND 
A Population and Economy 
The preliminary population total for the 2006 census of Ireland was 
4,234,925. The average annual rate of population increase in the 2002-2006 
period was two percent, which is the highest on record. 6 New Zealand has an 
estimated resident population of 4.14 million (at 30 June 2006). Permanent 
and long-term arrivals exceeded departures by 10,700 in the year to June 2006, 
an increase of one percent. 7 
The populations of Ireland and ew Zealand are similar in size. Both 
New Zealand and Ireland are reliant on immigration for population growth. 
Immigration to Ireland is remarkably higher than to New Zealand, largely due 
to its membership of the EU ( 4 7 percent of immigrants to Ireland came from 
EU countries in the year to April 20058). Therefore, the two countries are 
increasing in cultural diversity, although in significantly different ways.9 
6 "Census 2006 Preliminary Report" (Central Statistics Office, Government oflreland, 2006) 
<http://www.cso.ie/census/documents/2006PreliminaryReport.pdf> (last accessed 2S August 2006). 
7 "National Population Estimates - June 2006 Quarter" (Statistics New Zealand, 9 August 2006) 
<http://www. sta ts. govt.nz/products-and-services/hot-off- the-press/national-population-
es tima tes/na tional-popula tion-estima tes-j un06q tr-hotp .htrn> (last accessed 28 August 2006). 
8 Over a third of immigrants (38 percent) were nationals of the ten new EU accession states, that joined 
the EU on 1 May 2004, 17 percent of immigrants were from Poland, while nine percent were from 
Lithuania: "Population and Migration Estimates" (Central Statistics Office, Government of Ireland, 
4 
Irish society is considerably different from that of New Zealand. The 
Republic was founded on Roman Catholic principles. It was only in 1972 that 
Article 44.1.2, which recognised "the special position of the Holy Catholic and 
Apostolic Roman Church as the guardian of the faith professed by the great 
majority of the citizens", was removed from the Constitution. 10 
B Political Situation 
Irish political culture has been described as "particularly characterized 
by Catholic dominance, authoritarianism, personalism, and obsessional 
loyalty". 11 Further, it has been said that there is "a powerful tendency to 
assume the local morality is universally valid ... [ m ]inority views can be 
dismissed as deviant and unworthy of consideration". 12 
It is acknowledged that over the last 15 years, Irish society has 
changed noticeably. The prohibition on divorce was removed from the 
Constitution in 1995, albeit after a very divisive campaign and an extremely 
close referendum result, showing that, although the Catholic Church's 
influence was steadily weakening, 13 considerable influence remained. Irish 
society has also diversified due to the high levels of immigration. 
The tendency towards conservatism is reflected in Irish politics. The 
two largest parties, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael, have very little ideological 
difference between them. It appears that the only basis for the division 
between these parties is the opposing sides taken at the time of the formation 
of the Republic. The Party system has "institutionalized or is the embodiment 
2 00 5) <http://www. cso. ie/releasespub I ica ti ons/ documents/population/ current/popmig. pdf> (last 
accessed 28 August 2006). 
9 While many oflreland's immigrants come from EU countries, New Zealand's immigrants tend to 
come from the Pacific and Asia. 
1° Fifth Amendment of the Constitution Act 1972. 
11 Basil Chubb The Government and Politics of Ireland (1970), quoted in Valerie Bresnihan "The 
Symbolic Power oflreland's President Robinson" (1999) 29:2 Presidential Studies Quarterly 250, 255. 12 J P O'Carroll "Bishops, Knights - Pawn? Traditional Thought and the Irish Abortion Debate of 
1983" in Valerie Bresnihan, above n 11 , 255. 
13 Lorna Siggins The Woman who took power in the Park: Mary Robinson (Mainstream Publishing, 
Edinburgh, 1997) 181 . 
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of a conflict the occurred in the past" (that is, the civil war 1922-23). 14 
Effectively, Ireland has two large centre-right parties that never co-operate. 
Ideological issues are left to the small or single-issue parties and 
independents. 15 More recently, those smaller parties have gained in influence. 
After the last election, in 2002, the Dail was made up ofFianna Fail (81 seats); 
Fine Gael (31 seats); Labour Party (21 seats); Progressive Democrats (eight 
seats); Green Party (six seats); and Sinn Fein (five seats). 16 That is, the smaller 
parties hold 26 percent of the seats in the Dail, while the two major parties 
hold 74 percent. In comparison, in the 1977 Dail, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael 
held 127 seats, being 86 percent of the available seats. 17 The increase in 
influence of the smaller parties reflects the gradual change in society, and is 
made possible by the electoral system. 
The Republic of Ireland is divided into 41 constituencies, each of 
which elects three, four, or five members according to its population. The 
elections are conducted using the single transferable vote system. This has 
resulted in a virtual monopoly of government by the Fianna Fail party since 
1937, providing a majority government in 14 out of the first 19 elections. 
In New Zealand, the introduction of MMP has led to the two major 
political parties losing support in favour of the minor parties. In 1993, the two 
major parties held 95 of the 99 seats. In 2005, eight parties won seats in 
Parliament: ACT New Zealand (two), Green Party (six), Jim Anderton's 
Progressive (one), Labour Party (50), Maori Party (four), National Party (48), 
New Zealand First Party (seven), and United Future New Zealand (three). 18 In 
both Ireland and New Zealand, the increase in support for minor parties has 
increased the likelihood of the formation of coalition governments. 
14 Brian Farrell "The Context of Three Elections" in Howard Penniman and Brian Fan-ell (eds) Ireland at the Polls /981 , 1982, and 1987 (Duke University Press, 1997)1 , 1. 15 Farrell, above n 14, 1. 
16 Economist Intelligence Unit - Views Wire "Ireland: Political structure" (3 February 2006) . 17 Cornelius O 'Leary Irish Elections 1918-1977 (Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1979) 105. 18 2005 Election results <http://www.electionresults.govt.nz/e9/html/e9 _part! .html> (last accessed 25 August 2006). 
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Both Ireland and New Zealand have two official languages.19 On 
assuming office, Irish Presidents have chosen to make their declaration in 
Gaelic rather than English, even where they cannot themselves speak the 
language. In New Zealand, the present Governor-General, Anand Satyanand, 
chose to swear the oath in both English and Maori. 
C System of Government 
Ireland is a parliamentary democracy, reflecting its ongms m the 
Westminster system. The President is the Head of State. The functions of that 
position are similar to those of the Governor-General in New Zealand. He or 
she acts on the advice and authority of the Government. The President has a 
largely ceremonial role, much like the Governor-General. Ireland has a system 
of Cabinet Government ( although the word Cabinet is not used in the 
Constitution). The Taoiseach (Prime Minister) is the Head of Government. 
The Dail (lower House) nominates the Taoiseach and approves the nomination 
of the other members of Government. The Government is responsible to the 
Dail for the Departments of State administered by its members. The 
Taoiseach, Tanaiste (Deputy Prime Minister), and Minister for Finance must 
be members of the Dail, as must all Ministers who are not members of the 
Seanad (Senate, the upper House). Not more than two Ministers may be 
members of the Seanad. 
Bills may be initiated in either House, except Money Bills, which may 
only be initiated in the Dail. Once one House has passed a Bill, it is sent to the 
other House. A Bill passed by the Dail that the Seanad rejects or that the 
Seanad passes with amendments to which the Dail does not agree, or a Bill 
that is neither rejected nor passed within ninety days by the Seanad, may 
subsequently be enacted into law by resolution in the Dail. This resolution 
requires only an ordinary majority.20 Therefore the Seanad has no effective 
power of veto of Bills passed by the Dail. 
19 Bunreacht na hEireann, Article 8; Maori Language Act I 987, s 3. 20 Article 27; see below VF 3. 
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III THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT 
The President is the "ceremonial personification of the State". 21 Article 
13.9 makes clear that the President performs most functions on the advice of 
the Government. The President is the Supreme Commander of the Defence 
Forces. 22 He or she appoints the Attorney-General on the advice of the 
Taoiseach, and the Comptroller and Auditor General on the advice of the 
Dail. 23 The President also appoints Judges on the advice of the Government. 24 
The President has "the right to pardon and the power to commute or remit 
punishment imposed by any court exercising criminal jurisdiction".25 The 
Constitution makes no mention of the President's functions in relation to 
external relations. Ireland did not leave the Commonwealth until 1948, despite 
the Constitution being enacted in 1937. Section 3 of the Republic of Ireland 
Act 1948 provides that: 
The President, on the authority and on the advice of the Government, may exercise the executive power or any executive function of the State in or in connection with its external functions. 
However, this prov1s10n 1s not reflected in the Constitution. The All-Party 
Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution recommended that this provision 
should be inserted into the Constitution26, but this has not yet occurred. 
The symbolic role of the President is also important. While many of 
the early Presidents were retired politicians who tended not to be particularly 
active, in 1990 a new type of President was elected. Mary Robinson ran on the 
platform "A President with a purpose". At her inauguration, the new President 
summarised the aims of her Presidency. She wished to unify the country, and 
to welcome people from all parts of society.27 Reflecting this, she had 
21 The All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution "Third Progress Report - the President" 3 <http://www.constitution.ie/publications/default.asp?UserLang=EN> (last accessed 28 August 2006). ["Third Progress Report"]. 
22 Article 13.4 
23 Articles 30.2, 33.2. 
24 Article 35.1. 
25 Article 13.6. 
26 "Third Progress Report", above n 21. 27 Siggins, above n 13, 127. 
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representatives of the homeless, people with disabilities and those associated 
with women's rights on her personal guest list for the inauguration. She also 
wished to develop "a confident sense of Irishness".28 As the population 
diversifies, this becomes more difficult to achieve but more necessary to strive 
for. The current President, Mary McAleese is the first Northern Irish Catholic 
President, and her inauguration speech reflected her background. She said: 29 
.. . I know to speak of reconciliation is to raise a nervous query in the hearts of some North of the border, in the place of my birth . .. In Ireland, we know only too well the cruelty and capriciousness of violent conflict. Our own history has been hard on lives young and old. Too hard. Hard on those who died and those left behind with only shattered dreams and poignant memories. We hope and pray, indeed we insist, that we have seen the last of violence. We demand the right to solve our problems by dialogue and the noble pursuit of consensus. We hope to see that consensus pursued without the language of hatred and contempt and we wish all those engaged in that endeavour, well. 
The symbolic role has increased in importance during the terms of 
office of the last two Presidents. Mary Robinson signalled this change with her 
campaign slogan "A President with a Purpose",30 and her election on that 
platform can be seen as a vindication of that role. 
A The Role of the Governor-General 
In New Zealand, the Governor-General is likewise the ceremonial 
Head of State. This role includes such duties as the opening of new sessions of 
Parliament, holding honours investitures, welcoming visiting Heads of State, 
receiving the credentials of foreign diplomats and attending Waitangi Day 
commemorations. 
In New Zealand, Governors-General have also each made their mark 
on the office, particularly after it became the convention to appoint New 
Zealand-born persons to the office. New Zealand's first New Zealand-born 
Governor-General was Sir Arthur Porritt, who was appointed in 1967. 
28 Siggins, above n 13, 128. 
29 Mary McAleese "Inauguration Speech" (11 November 1997) 
<http://www.president.ie/index.php?section=5&speech=6&lang=eng> (last accessed 28 August 2006). 30 Siggins, above n 13, 127. 
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Sir Paul Reeves was the first Governor-General of Maori descent. In 
his farewell speech he spoke about the Treaty of Waitangi, and about Maori 
and Pakeha relations:3 1 
The Treaty is a framework for a partnership in which Maoris must be able 
to develop their culture and institutions, just as non Maoris have done, and 
to use the resources of the nation for this purpose. 
We don' t always handle this process very well. Every now and then, we 
get confusion when people of one culture try to manage the affairs of 
people of another culture. If we get it right, often we get it right 
accidentally. We must learn from our experience. 
So name your fears. Move beyond guilt and confusion to mature and 
responsible action. If losing control frightens you, acknowledge it. If the 
unfamiliar threatens, or the cost of reconciliation seems too much, 
acknowledge that. 
In 1990, the first female Governor-General, Dame Catherine Tizard, 
was appointed. Her swearing-in speech reflected the aims she had for her time 
in office: 32 
I thank and applaud my predecessor in office, Sir Paul Reeves, who added 
so much to this debate by his forthright, thoughtful and determined 
discussion of matters of real importance to New Zealand' s development as 
a truly bi-cultural partnership in an increasingly informed multi-racial 
community. 
I hope that I, in my tum, can make a contribution to furthering 
understanding, not only between Maori and Pakeha but also of those issues 
which polarise: - men and women; north and south; urban and rural 
dwellers. 
However, it may be that Dame Silvia Cartwright was a more proactive 
Governor-General than Dame Catherine Tizard. At her swearing-in in 2001, 
Cartwright signalled that she was going to be outspoken on issues that she 
believed were important: 33 
Pride in achievements here at home must be more muted. We may lead the 
world in family violence legislation and policy but at least on the face ofit, 
we are also at the forefront in the perpetration of child abuse, family 
violence and serious sexual assaults. While there are many reasons for 
31 Sir Paul Reeves "Commemoration of the Signing of the Treaty of Waitangi" (Waitangi, 6 Feburary 1987) <http://www.gov-gen.govt.nz/media/speeches.asp?type=current&ID=l 87> (last accessed 28 August 2006). 
32 Dame Catherine Tizard "At her Swearing-in Ceremony" (Wellington, 12 December 1990) <http://www.gov-gen.govt.nz/media/speeches.asp?type=current&ID=48> (last accessed 28 August 2006). 
33 Dame Silvia Cartwright "At her Swearing-in Ceremony" (Parliament House, Wellington, 4 April 2001) <http:/ /www.gov-gen.govt.nz/media/speeches.asp?type=archive&ID=2 l 5> (last accessed 28 August 2006). 
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these shameful statistics, how can we hold our heads up internationally as peace negotiators and peacekeepers unless we promote and practice peace in our own communities? 
Again, in her farewell speech, Cartwright commented:34 
Sometimes when I listen to a foreign leader praise our efforts in the environment or our willingness to assist those in war-ravaged countries, I hope that our dark secrets - for they remain hidden to the rest of the world - will never become known internationally. I am concerned that these countries that so admire us might soon learn that we have a terrible rate of family and other violence, that although we have one of the finest, least corrupt Police Forces and Court systems in the world, this violence remains unacceptably high. 
It is clear that the words of the fifth Irish President Cearbhall 0 
Dalaigh, at his inauguration in 1974: "Presidents, under the Irish Constitution 
don't have policies. But ... a President can have a theme",35 apply equally to 
Governors-General in New Zealand. 
Sir Michael Hardie Boys' contribution was his articulation of the role 
of the Governor-General in the new MMP environment, which has been 
acknowledged by his successors as invaluable.36 The current Governor-
General, and the first Governor-General of Fijian-Indian descent, Anand 
Satyanand said at his swearing-in ceremony: 37 
There are many families in New Zealand like mine, who share stories of journeys to reach this country. New Zealand 's culture and identity is now a blend of Maori, European, Pacific Island and Asian influences. Our heritage is honoured, but new influences continue to come from those who have chosen to belong to ew Zealand as the place to which they, as active citizens, will contribute .. . And let us strengthen, foster and encourage trust among the various communities that make up New Zealand. That will make us strong. Our ambition should be, may I suggest, to go forward on the basis of our communities trusting each other - not blindly, but with good judgement and liberal amounts of information, insight, understanding and goodwill. 
The office of Governor-General is an important symbol of nationhood, 
with each Governor-General bringing his or her own particular perspective. In 
34 Dame Silvia Cartwright "Address at her State Farewell" (Parliament House) Wellington, 2 August 2006) <http://www.gov-gen.govt.nz/media/speeches.asp?type=current&ID=275> (last accessed 28 August 2006). 
35 Quoted in McAleese "Inauguration Speech", above n 29. 36 Cartwright "At her Swearing-in Ceremony", above n 33. 37 The Hon Anand Satyanand "At His Swearing-in Ceremony" (23 August 2006) <http://www.gov-gen.govt.nz/media/speeches.asp?type=current&ID=276> (last accessed 28 August 2006). 
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Ireland, recent Presidents have taken a similar role. To be such a symbol is an 
important function of the Head of State. In ew Zealand, the Governor-
General may be carefully selected to be such a symbol, but where a President 
is elected, the country is in effect choosing which symbol they wish to 
represent them. The people may feel more connected to a symbol they have 
chosen. 
IV PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION 
A Election Not Selection 
Article 12.2.1 of the Irish Constitution states that the President shall be 
elected by direct vote of the people. The presidential term is seven years. A 
President may not serve for more than two terms. Since 1937 there have been 
eight Presidents. On six occasions out of the 13 times a President has been 
chosen there has been no election because there was only one validly 
nominated candidate. There has been considerable debate about the 
desirability of this system. In 2004, the ability of the incumbent President, 
Mary McAleese, to nominate herself combined with the agreement of all 
parties in the Dail not to nominate another candidate ensured the incumbent 
President was returned unopposed. Only four Presidents have nominated 
themselves for re-election. Three of these were returned unopposed. Sean 
O'Kelly was re-elected unopposed in 1952 and Dr Patrick Hillery was re-
elected unopposed in 1983. Eamon de Valera nominated himself for re-
election in 1966, but another candidate was nominated and an election took 
place, which de Valera won. Further, there was no contested election between 
1973 and 1990 as only one candidate was nominated in each case. It seems 
that this system results too often in the President being in effect selected rather 
than elected. This seems to be too much of a compromise. If the President is to 
be elected, the people should be able to vote in every case; otherwise, the 
democratic principle of election is not being upheld. This situation results 
largely from the nomination process. 
12 
B Nomination Process 
The nomination process is highly restrictive. The restrictions appear to 
have been designed to avoid the danger that small extremist groups might use 
the presidential election as a means of getting attention by running a 
candidate. 38 The nomination process has meant that there has often been only 
one candidate for the presidency. Where there is only one candidate for the 
office it is not necessary to proceed to a ballot for that candidate's election.39 
Article 12.4.2 sets out the process for nomination. Every candidate for election 
must be nominated either by 20 members of the Oireachtas (the legislature, 
which includes the Dail and the Seanad), or by the Councils of four 
administrative counties. In effect, this has meant that the majority party has 
often been able to put forward a candidate unopposed. It is also of note that 
between 1945 and 1990, all of the Presidents were members of Fianna Fail 
(the dominant political party), and the current President also has Fianna Fail 
backing. As Kelly puts it, "the nomination requirement prescribed by Article 
12.4.2 has the almost inevitable consequence of preventing the emergence of 
non-party candidates for election".40 In 1990, a case was taken to the High 
Court seeking an injunction to prevent the election from taking place on the 
basis that the nomination process was contrary to the common good. The case 
was dismissed because of the plaintiffs delay in initiating it and no opinion 
was expressed on the argument. 41 
In 1995, the Constitution Review Group considered whether there 
should continue to be direct elections for the presidency.42 They noted that the 
invocation by the President of a presumed mandate for a particular policy 
could create tensions between the President, Parliament and Government, and 
that indirect election, by a majority in Parliament or a special electoral college 
38 Jim Duffy "Appendix 4 - Overseas studies: Ireland" in The Report of the Republic Advisory Committee An Australian Republic: The Options Volume 2 (1993) Commonwealth of Australia 136. 39 Article 12.4.5. 
40 John Maurice Kelly, Gerard W Hogan, Gerry Whyte The Irish Constitution (3 ed, Butterworths, Dublin, 1994) 52. 
41 Lennon v Minister for the Environment in Kelly, above n 40. 42 Constitution Review Group "The Report of the Constitution Review Group" (Government of Ireland, July 1996) 22 <http://www.constitution.ie/publications/default.asp?UserLang=EN> (last accessed 28 August 2006). [Constitution Review Group]. 
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could obviate this problem.43 However, they concluded that, as there is no 
public demand for change, it may be inferred that the people wish to retain 
their right to vote directly for a President.44 In fact, it seems the public would 
be highly unlikely to want to give up their right to vote and to hand over the 
appointing of the President to politicians. This was made clear in Australia by 
the referendum on the republican issue, in which it seemed the public would 
prefer to remain a monarchy rather than hand over the power of appointing the 
President to politicians. Public opinion is important in a democracy, and the 
fact that, even if there is a danger of politicising the office, the public would 
prefer to retain the right to vote must be taken into account. The Review 
Group also suggested the nomination procedures were too restrictive and in 
need of democratisation, and that some alternative mechanism ought to be 
considered. 
The Third Progress Report of the All-Party Oireachtas Committee on 
the Constitution, dealing with the President, was published in 1998.45 The 
Group looked at the issue of whether the nomination procedures were too 
restrictive.46 They came to the conclusion that there should be reform in this 
area. They suggested that the provisions for indirect nomination should be 
altered so that only ten members of the Oireachtas would be required for a 
nomination. They also suggested that provision should be made for popular 
nomination. They were concerned that popular nomination could result in "the 
possibility that the office of President could be demeaned by the nomination of 
frivolous candidates or endangered by the nomination of inadequately 
qualified ones".47 Therefore, they suggested that popular nomination should 
require nomination by 10,000 citizens. To carry out these recommendations 
would require amendment of the Constitution, which stipulates that such an 
amendment must be passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas and by a 
majority of the voters in a referendum.48 As of yet, no steps appear to have 
been taken to implement these recommendations. This could be because, 
43 Constitution Review Group, above n 42, 22. 44 Constitution Review Group, above n 42 22. 45 "Third Progress Report", above n 21. 
46 "Third Progress Report", above n 21 , 4-9. 
47 "Third Progress Report", above n 21 , 6. 
48 Article 46. 
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despite all the concerns, there do not seem to have been any real problems 
with the system tending to produce Presidents from a particular party. 
However, it seems desirable to encourage elections to take place, and a ew 
Zealand model should aim for this goal. 
C A Political President? - The Irish Experience 
In regards to direct election, Harris asserts "party politics would 
dominate the process, and the elected president would be overtly placed 
somewhere on the political spectrum".49 
The President does not appear to have become politicised. The fact that 
the citizens have often not been able to exercise their constitutional right to 
vote may in fact have prevented the politicisation of the office. In 1985, David 
Gwynn Morgan suggested that where a President is elected, the "divisive, 
nationwide battle" would lead to the President being associated with the party 
that supported their campaign. 50 Jim Duffy also suggests that the lack of 
elections "has almost single-handedly helped to ensure that the presidency is 
not seen as a rival power base to the Government. Presidential elections have 
been so rare as to ensure the public, for most of the office ' s history, has been 
unable to identify with the office." 51 
The 1990 Presidential campaign, which was the first to be contested 
for 17 years, the first to be contested by three candidates since 1945, and was 
certainly divisive and controversial, resulted in the election of Ireland ' s first 
female President, Mary Robinson (who was nominated by the Labour Party 
although she was not a member of it). In the last two weeks before the 
election, Garret Fitzgerald, a former Fine Gael Taoiseach, accused the Fianna 
Fail candidate Lenihan of making improper phone calls to the President 
following the collapse of the coalition Government in 1982 in which he asked 
the President to invite the leader of Fianna Fail to form a Government without 
49 Harris, above n 2, 300. 
50 David Gwynn Morgan Constitutional Law of lreland: the Law of the Executive, Legislature, and Judicature (Round Hall Press, Dublin, 1985) 53 . 5 1 Duffy, above n 38, 136, para 3.8. 
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an election. Lenihan denied this had occurred. However, three days later, Jim 
Duffy, a political science postgraduate student and former president of the 
Fine Gael branch (the author has been unable to clarify whether this is the 
same Jim Duffy who wrote Appendix 4 of An Australian Republic: The 
Options, but it seems possible) released a tape recording of an interview with 
Lenihan in which he unambiguously stated that he had made the phone calls. 
Lenihan continued to deny that the phone calls had been made. The Taoiseach 
sacked Lenihan from the Cabinet and the party after he refused to resign. 52 
Other issues were raked up, with another member of Fianna Fail alleging that 
Mary Robinson would allow abortion referral clinics in the President's 
residence should she be elected. The last newspaper poll before the election 
showed Lenihan and Robinson at 43 percent each, with Austin Currie, the Fine 
Gael candidate at 14 percent. What finally determined the election was the 
STY voting system. Seventy-seven percent of the people who voted for Currie 
as their first choice, made Robinson their second choice. It was noted that, 
ironically: 53 
Mary Robinson was elected not by the left vote, the women's vote, or the 'progressive' vote, but by transfers from probably conservative Fine Gael voters for whom Mary Robinson's chief attraction was that she was not Brian Lenihan and not Fianna Fail. 
Despite the divisive election campaign, Mary Robinson seems to have 
been considered one of Ireland's best Presidents She was certainly the most 
active, making numerous public appearances and overseas visits, and the 
author has not found evidence that the campaign damaged her presidency in 
any way. There was tension between Robinson and the Taoiseach Charles 
Haughey, but Robinson appears to have been always aware of her 
constitutional position and of the need to keep her role free from 
controversy. 54 
Similarly, after Robinson's resignation m 1997, the presidential 
election was contested by five candidates, and was eventually won by Mary 
52 Siggins, above n 13, 138-143. 
53 Jim Farrelly, quoted in Siggins above n 13 , 143. 54 See generally Siggins, above n 13. 
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McAleese, the first Northern Irish Catholic to hold the office. She was re-
elected as President in 2004 without a vote, as she was the only validly 
nominated candidate. 
It appears that until 1990, Presidents were elected and served their 
terms largely without controversy. Basil Chubb has described the first 
Presidents as "elderly, inert, and scrupulous in keeping themselves outside and 
above political argument". 55 The only real problem occurred in 1976 when the 
President resigned after the Taoiseach refused to disown the public criticism 
of the President by the Minister of Defence. President O Dalaigh resigned to 
prevent the office becoming associated with political controversy. 56 
It appears that direct election has not led to the politicisation of the 
office of President, although the nomination process clearly needs some work 
to increase the likelihood of the public having the opportunity to vote, in order 
to avoid the criticism that the Irish President is often selected rather than 
elected. The office has remained largely ceremonial and above controversy. It 
may be that the opening up of the nomination process recommended by the 
Review Group would indeed fix the problems, but this has not yet been tested. 
What the presidential selection process in Ireland seems to show is that it is 
not inevitable that direct election leads to politicisation of the office. However, 
New Zealand's political situation, and the desirability of elections being held 
in every case, means it is likely that a nomination process such as the one 
suggested by the Review Group would lead to highly politicised campaigns in 
New Zealand. Does this in fact matter? The Ireland experience seems to 
suggest that by keeping the office itself out of politics, the election process 
may not impact adversely on the presidential office. Andrew Stockley argues 
that it is a mistake to pretend the holder of the office of Governor-General is 
divorced from politics: the Governor-General is appointed, by convention, on 
the advice of Prime Minister, and there is nothing to stop there being a 
political appointee: "the claim that NZ's governor-general is above and 
55 Basil Chubb The Government and Politics of Ireland (2 ed, Stanford University Press, California, 1982) 200. 
56 Neil Collins and Terry Cradden lrish Politics Today (3 ed, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1997) 99. 
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beyond politics is something of a myth". 57 In 1977, a seemingly political 
appointment was made, when the ational Party Prime Minister, Sir Robert 
Muldoon, appointed Sir Keith Holyoake to the office. Sir Keith was a long-
serving National MP and had been Prime Minister in a ational Government 
from 1960 until 1972. However, as nothing arose during his term to test his 
impartiality, nothing turned on this point. 
D Why Election Rather Than Selection? 
As has been noted above, the public appear to prefer to be able to vote 
for their President rather than leaving the appointment up to politicians. This 
has been shown in Ireland, and in Australia. The office is important 
ceremonially, symbolically, and constitutionally. Therefore it is necessary that 
the office is held by a person who has the appropriate background, knowledge 
and skills to perform these roles adequately. The danger that a frivolous 
candidate will be put up and will win can be obviated by the nomination 
process. The fact that often a single candidate is nominated and therefore no 
election is held may have helped to keep the office free from politics. 
However, it seems preferable that, where there is only one candidate, a 
plebiscite takes place on the election of the single candidate as provided for in 
Article 60(1) of the Austrian Federal Constitution.58 Presumably, if the 
candidate is not approved, another candidate must be nominated and the 
process repeated. This could potentially be very expensive and time-
consuming, and it would be therefore be advisable that a candidate who 1s 
unlikely to be acceptable to the public is not put up at all. 
The President is not answerable to the Courts or the Oireachtas for the 
exercise of the functions and powers of the office. 59 Therefore, direct election 
is also important for accountability. The prohibition on serving for more than 
two terms causes some difficulty here as, in the second term, the President is 
57 Andrew P Stockley "Becoming a Republic? Matters of Symbolism" in Luke Trainor ( ed) Republicanism in New Zealand (The Dunmore Press Ltd, Palmerston North, 1996). 58 Duffy, above n 38, 137. 
59 Article 8.1. 
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arguably less accountable as they cannot seek re-election. It may be that this 
restriction should be removed. 
In the New Zealand context, election seems preferable. omination 
should be by members of Parliament. The popular nomination suggested for 
Ireland is probably unadvisable in the New Zealand context as there seems a 
real possibility that inappropriate and under-qualified candidates could be put 
forward. The office ought to be a dignified and responsible one and not 
everyone who might be nominated by the public would be suitable. It seems 
likely that great sporting personalities or other well-known persons could 
easily attain the support necessary for nomination but, in fact, would be 
unsuitable for the role. Nomination by 20 members of Parliament would 
enable a number of candidates to be nominated. It seems preferable to 
encourage multiple candidates and therefore elections. It could be that a 
convention would be enough to encourage this, or alternatively, some more 
formal requirement could be put in place to ensure that at least two candidates 
are nominated in every case. A constitutional convention seems preferable, 
however, as it may be that situations arise where there is general popular 
consensus that only one candidate need be nominated. 
It is acknowledged that elections may be costly, however, because of 
the symbolic nature of the office, the lack of judicial accountability, and the 
constitutional power of the role, elections are preferable to the all-too common 
situation in Ireland where candidates are declared President without going to 
the public for a mandate. 
V THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT 
A Formal Powers 
The President's powers are largely formal in function. The President 
summons and dissolves the Dail on the advice of the Taoiseach (Article 
13.2.1). The President appoints the Taoiseach on the nomination of the Dail 
(Article 13 .1.1) and the other Ministers on the nomination of the Taoiseach 
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(Article 13.1.2). The President accepts the resignation of any Minister or 
terminates the appointment of a Minister who refuses to resign, on the advice 
of the Taoiseach. 60 These are all formal roles, in which no discretion can be 
exercised. The Constitution Review Group considered whether the President 
should be given more discretionary powers but concluded "the President 
should not be given further discretionary powers. The symbolic value of the 
office derives from the detachment of the holder from partisan politics". 61 
In New Zealand, the great majority of the Governor-General's powers 
are formal. The Governor-General, by convention, acts on the advice of the 
executive council. It is only in reserve powers that the Governor-General has 
any discretion. The reserve powers are generally accepted to be the power to 
appoint a Prime Minister and the power to refuse to dissolve Parliament. 
B Dissolution of the Dail 
Article 13.2.2 allows the President to "in his absolute discretion refuse 
to dissolve Dail Eireann on the advice of a Taoiseach who has ceased to retain 
the support of a majority in Dail Eireann". This power could have been used 
on four occasions but in each case dissolution was granted despite the fact the 
elections had only recently taken place.62 In fact, on two of the four occasions 
the Government had not been defeated but wanted to increase its majority. 63 
The test for ascertaining that the Taoiseach has "ceased to retain the 
support of a majority" is not clear. It may be that a formal vote of no 
confidence in the Dail would be necessary. However, as Hogan points out, if 
this were the test, a Taoiseach who could not command a majority of the Dail 
could pre-empt a confidence vote and ask the President to grant a dissolution 
under Article 13.1. This is because the discretion to refuse to dissolve can only 
be exercised under Article 13.2.2 if the test is satisfied. Gerald Hogan 
considered that the phrase does not simply mean a formal vote in the Dail but 
60 Article 13 .1.3 . 
61 "Third Progress Report", above n 21 , 10. 
62 Morgan, above n 50, 72 . 
63 Morgan, above n 50, 72. 
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may also extend to other situations where "by reason of developments inside 
and outside the House, it is clear the Taoiseach has lost his majority". 64 
Professor James Casey says "the view generally held is that a dissolution can 
be refused only if an alternative government is feasible, can be assured of a 
working majority and can be expected to carry on for a reasonable period of 
time". 65 It seems, however, that the President is not able to participate in the 
formation of a new Government, but must wait until the Dail nominates a new 
Taoiseach. The President cannot "send for" another Deputy to form a 
Government even if it is clear that that Deputy would be able to command a 
majority of the Dail.66 
If a Taoiseach ceases to retain the support of a majority of the Dail and 
requests a dissolution, which the President declines to give, the Taoiseach 
must resign. 67 Following the resignation, it is up to the parties in the Dail to 
sort out who is to be the next Taoiseach. Once these negotiations are 
concluded, the Dail will nominate a new Taoiseach and the President will then 
formally appoint that person. 
1 Constitution Review Committees - reform options 
The Constitution Review Group considered these issues in its 1996 
report. 68 The Review Group looked at the options of introducing a fixed-term 
Dail or a constructive vote of no confidence. 
a Fixed-term Dail 
The introduction of a fixed-term Dail could be done simply by deleting 
Articles 13.2.1, 13 .2.2 and 16.3.1 of the Constitution, that is, all the provisions 
for dissolving the Dail, and then replacing Article 16.5 with a new Article 
64 Gerald Hogan "Issues Arising from the 1989 General Election" (1989) Irish Jurist 157, 167. 65 James Casey Constitutional Law in Ireland, cited in "Third Progress Report", above n 21 , and in Kelly, above n 40 (the writer was unable to obtain a copy of this book). 66 Kelly, above n 40, 55. 
67 Article 28.10 "The Taoiseach shall resign from office upon his ceasing to retain the support of a majority in Dail Eireann unless on his advice the President dissolves Dail Eireann and on the reassembly of Dail Eireann after the dissolution the Taoiseach secures the support ofa majority in Dail Eireann." 
68 Constitution Review Group, above n 42. 
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stating "[ e] lections to Dail Eireann will take place every four years, according 
to a schedule regulated by law". The Review Group believed that a fixed-term 
Dail would remove the possibility of a Government calling a general election 
while still undefeated in the hope of strengthening its position, and would 
remove the uncertainty that seems to prevail in the final twelve to eighteenth 
months of a Dail term because the Government is looking for the best time to 
go to an election. They noted, however, that a fixed-term Dail would be less 
democratic as it involves less consultation with the electorate. The other 
difficulty would be if a political deadlock were to arise in which no 
Government could be formed from the existing Dail. Therefore it would be 
necessary to provide for dissolution in this situation. The Review Group 
suggested a provision for dissolution, "after a Government resignation or 
defeat, if no Taoiseach had been elected after, say, sixty days". 69 They noted 
that fixed-term Parliaments are a rarity and that "the orwegian experience is 
not persuasive as to the superior merits of a fixed-term system". 70 
b Constructive vote of no confidence 
The constructive vote of no confidence was considered more 
favourably by the Review Group. "A constructive vote of no confidence ... 
forces the legislature to agree upon a viable alternative before it can defeat the 
Government". 71 This could be introduced by amending Article 28.10 to 
include the words "demonstrated by the loss of a motion of no confidence that, 
at the same time, nominates an alternative Taoiseach". The Review Group 
noted the possibility of the Taoiseach resigning in anticipation of losing a 
constructive vote of no confidence. They suggested that a provision could be 
inserted into the Constitution that prevented the Taoiseach resigning when a 
constructive vote of no confidence had been tabled. This option would address 
the issue of when the President could refuse to dissolve the Dail, as it would 
only be when a vote of no confidence had not made clear a new Government 
could be formed that the President would dissolve the Dail. It also addresses 
the issue of presidential interference in government formation. The Review 
69 Constitution Review Group, above n 42, Article 28 Issue 6 (b ). 7° Constitution Review Group, above n 42, Article 28 Issue 6 (b). 71 Constitution Review Group, above n 42, Article 28 Issue 6 (a). 
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Group considered the option of giving the President a role such as a Governor-
General has in the process of identifying a new Prime Minister. They 
considered the constructive vote of no confidence was a preferable option. 
This prevents the President becoming involved in politics.72 
It seems that the constructive vote of no confidence may be a sensible 
requirement. It would provide greater certainty. If a Government has lost the 
support of the majority of the Dail, a constructive vote of no confidence would 
signal that another Government could be formed. Whereas, following a 
confidence vote, if no Government could be formed, but the Taoiseach had 
lost the confidence of the Dail, the Taoiseach would have to advise the 
President to dissolve the Dail and the President would have to accept that 
advice. 
c Clarification of President's discretion 
The All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution 1996-1997 
(the O'Keefe Committee) considered the constructive vote of no confidence. 
They concluded that there was a danger in the option: 73 
A weak government formed following a general election may seek to avoid 
a constructive vote of no confidence by pandering to the interest of the 
opposition and a weak government which has come into power following 
the success of a vote of no confidence may seek to avoid all difficult issues 
in order not to provoke another constructive vote of no confidence. 
With due respect, this seems to be a weak argument. There appears to be no 
more danger of this occurring than in the present situation where there is always 
the threat of a confidence vote. The Committee suggested instead that, where a 
Taoiseach who has lost the support of the Dail, the President should only grant a 
dissolution if, within ten days from the vote of no confidence, the Dail has not 
elected a new Taoiseach. They recommended that certain factors would be 
required to indicate that the Taoiseach had lost the support of the Dail. They 
also suggested that the President should have the power to summon the Dail 
72 Constitution Review Group, above n 42, Article 28 Issue 6 (a). 73 In "Third Progress Report", above n 21. 
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within three days to vote on a motion of confidence where the President deems 
the Taoiseach may have ceased to retain the support of the Dail. 
d Arguments for retaining the status quo 
The Third Progress Report of the All-Party Oireachtas Committee on 
the Constitution also considered these issues. The Committee was concerned 
that the definition of the circumstances in which the President might refuse 
dissolution would lead to a practice whereby Presidents refused dissolution as 
a matter of course. This could create an expectation that, in certain 
circumstances, there would be a refusal and failure to refuse could be viewed 
as a political act in itself. This would increase the political involvement of the 
President.74 They did not endorse the idea of a constructive vote of no 
confidence or of giving the President power to intervene in Government 
formation. Their reasoning was that "the government formation process in 
Ireland has not, broadly speaking, been a perplexing one. The committee 
therefore recommends no change."75 While this argument is perhaps a little 
short-sighted, part of the conclusion seems to be correct. The President should 
retain the discretion to decide when dissolution should be refused. The 
uncertainty surrounding when the Taoiseach has "ceased to retain the support 
of a majority of the Dail" should not be resolved by definition. Increased 
definition detracts from the utility of the discretion. It does seem advisable, 
however, to follow the O'Keefe Committee's recommendation that the 
President should be given the power to summon the Dail for a vote of 
confidence within three days of deeming that the Taoiseach may have lost the 
confidence of the Dail. The President already has the power to convene a 
meeting of the Dail after consultation with the Council of State,76 and a 
provision could also be included to allow the President to require a vote of 
confidence. 
74 "Third Progress Report", above n 21. 
75 "Third Progress Report", above n 21. 
76 Article 13.2.3. 
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2 The Governor-General 's power to refuse to dissolve parliament 
In New Zealand, the Governor-General has, as one of the reserve 
powers, the power to refuse to dissolve Parliament. The Governor-General 
may call on the leader of the party or coalition that can command a majority in 
the House to invite them to form a Government. Although this power has 
never been used in New Zealand, it does seem possible. It has been said that 
there is no requirement that the Governor-General must consider whether 
another party could form a Government. 77 However, a former Governor-
General, Sir Michael Hardie Boys suggested that, if the National-New Zealand 
First coalition had fallen apart in 1997 and Jenny Shipley had advised him to 
dissolve Parliament, "if it was very clear a different alignment in the existing 
parliament could govern, then the request is likely to be refused and that other 
alignment appointed to govern". 78 It is unclear exactly what the Governor-
General must do in this situation. If the Prime Minister had lost confidence but 
refused to resign - an unlikely situation, but a possibility - it is not clear 
whether the Governor-General could dismiss him or her. Under the Irish 
model, the situation would have been more certain. If the Prime Minister 
requested a dissolution in these circumstances, the President could have 
refused to dissolve Parliament. The Prime Minister would therefore have had 
to resign,79 which means that the entire Government is deemed to have 
resigned. 80 The President would then have waited until a new Prime Minister 
was nominated by Parliament. On the nomination of a new Prime Minister, the 
President would formally appoint them. Note that this situation would only 
occur where it was clear another Government could be formed. If this were not 
clear, the President would agree to the dissolution. 
77 Angela Jane McDonald "Constraining a President: a Republican Challenge for Australia and New Zealand" LLM Research Paper, VUW, 2005 , 36. 
78 Rt Hon Sir Michael Hardie Boys '" Nodding Automaton' Some Reflections on the Office of Governor-General" (2001-2002) 8 Canterbury L Rev 425, 431. 79 Article 28.10. 
80 Article 28.l 1.1. 
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3 The Cook Islands 
In July 2006, a constitutional cns1s of sorts occurred in the Cook 
Islands. This "crisis" is pertinent to this paper for a number of reasons. The 
High Commissioner of the Cook Islands (the Queen's representative in the 
Cook Islands) has the powers set out in the Cook Islands Constitution. Article 
37(3) of the Cook Islands Constitution states: 
The High Commissioner may at any time, by notice published in the Cook 
Islands Gazette, dissolve the Legislative Assembly if he is advised by the 
Premier to do so, but shall not be obliged to act in this respect in 
accordance with the advice of the Premier unless the High Commissioner 
is satisfied, acting in his discretion, that in tendering that advice the 
Premier commands the confidence of a majority of the members of the 
Assembly. 
A by-election was held in which the Government lost one seat, 
meaning that they no longer had a majority in the House. The Premier advised 
the High Commissioner to dissolve Parliament. The High Commissioner 
accepted that advice and decided "with immediate effect" to dissolve 
Parliament. The High Commissioner said that his reason for accepting the 
advice was that he was satisfied that "under article 37(3) of the Constitution, I 
have a discretion as to whether or not I am obliged to act upon that advice". 81 
The High Commissioner was widely criticised for this decision. In a letter to 
the editor, one critic said:82 
I did not see or read anyone disputing the right of the [High 
Commissioner] under Article 37(3) of the Constitution to dissolve 
Parliament and I for one would not do that either. But the fact of the matter 
is the [High Commissioner] did not take steps to ensure that the advice 
given to him by the PM was correct ... It is obvious to everyone that the 
[High Commissioner] acted prejudiciously and was so politically biased 
towards the PM and his government ... He was so afraid to consult with the 
above leaders and too frightened to test his concem(s) in Parliament that he 
made a desperate decision to dissolve Parliament before Jim was ousted in 
a vote of no confidence. 
8 1 Charles A Sweeney QC "The Constitutional crisis in the Cook Islands: An Introduction to the 
Issues" (Cook Islands Bar, 2006) <http: //www.cookislandsbar.com/> (last accessed 28 August 2006). 82 Tupou Faireka, MP Tupapa Marearenga "Letter to the Editor" (Cook Islands Herald, 5 August 2006) <http: //www.ciherald.co.ck/articles/h3 l4i.htrn> (last accessed 28 August 2006). 
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After the High Commissioner announced that he was dissolving Parliament, 
the members of the Opposition and the Speaker gathered in the parliamentary 
chamber and the Speaker purported to open a session of Parliament during 
which a motion of no confidence was carried by all present. o members of 
the Government were present. The question therefore arose as to whether this 
was a valid parliamentary session or not. Members of the Opposition 
threatened to take the High Commissioner to court. It was discussed whether 
or not this was possible.83 However, it appears that, with time, the issue has 
gone away. A new election was held in September 2006. At the time of this 
paper, it is not yet clear which party has won the most seats, with special votes 
still to be counted. It seems that Article 14(3) of the Cook Islands Constitution 
would address the issue in any case. That Article provides: 
(3) The appointment of the Premier shall also be terminated by the 
High Commissioner-
( a) If the Premier ceases to be a member of the Legislative 
Assembly for any reason other than the dissolution of 
the Assembly; or 
(b) If the Legislative Assembly passes a motion in express 
words of no confidence in Cabinet or if Cabinet is 
defeated on any question or issue which the Premier has 
declared to be a question or issue of confidence: 
Provided that, if after the passing of such a motion or 
after that defeat the Premier so requests, the High 
Commissioner, acting in his discretion, may dissolve the 
Legislative Assembly instead of terminating the 
appointment of the Premier . .. 
The proviso to Article 14(3)(b) suggests that the High Commissioner 
was acting within his discretion. Even if the confidence vote in the House was 
valid, the High Commissioner could have dissolved the Legislative Assembly, 
as it would be within his discretion to do so. 
If this situation arose in New Zealand, the Governor-General would 
have discretion as to whether or not to dissolve Parliament. The Governor-
General could have invited another member to form a Government. There is 
strictly no convention that he must consider this option, as the situation has not 
yet occurred in New Zealand, but it seems the Governor-General should look 
to invite the formation of a new Government if that is possible. However, if 
83 Sweeney, above n 81. 
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the Governor-General disregarded the Prime Minister' s advice to dissolve 
Parliament, the Prime Minister would resign, leaving the Governor-General 
without a Government. The Governor-General must have a Government, and 
therefore, the Governor-General would have to be certain another Government 
could be formed. 
Under the Irish model, what would happen in this situation would 
depend on the interpretation of the phrase "ceased to retain the support of a 
majority" of the House. This has never been considered, as the President has 
never exercised the discretion not to dissolve. If the phrase requires a formal 
vote in the Dail, the President would have had no choice but to dissolve the 
House on the advice of the Premier. If it is more discretionary than that and 
allows the President to make a judgement on where the support of the majority 
lies, the President may refuse to dissolve the House, but is under no obligation 
to do so. 
The Irish model provides some degree of certainty that is lacking in 
New Zealand's convention model. It does not provide all the answers in this 
situation, but is clearer to some extent. It does seem that the President retains 
some discretion in deciding where the support of the majority of the House 
lies, which is very important. The very nature of politics means that some 
discretion is required as no two "crises" will be exactly the same. The 
retention of discretion allows these situations to be dealt with as appropriate in 
the circumstances. 
C Appointment of Prime Minister and Cabinet 
As has been noted, while the President formally appoints the 
Taoiseach, there is no discretion attached to this function. Article 13 .1.1 
provides "[ t ]he President shall, on the nomination of Dail Eireann, appoint the 
Taoiseach, that is, the head of the Government or Prime Minister". Article 
13.1.2 then provides "[t]he President, shall, on the nomination of the 
Taoiseach with the previous approval of Dail Eireann, appoint the other 
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members of the Government". It seems that, as there is no discretion attached 
to these roles, there have been no problems with them. 
The Constitution Review Group considered whether the President 
should have a role in the formation of a new Government. They note that the 
lack of discretion in this area is "quite unusual in parliamentary government 
systems, and underscores a desire to maintain a position for the President 
impeccably remote from party politics".84 They did, however, acknowledge 
that there may be difficulties where a new Dail assembles and no party or 
group of parties has an overall majority, but they concluded that the 
intervention of the President would not secure a Government more quickly. 
The All Party Committee of the Oireachtas agreed with this conclusion in the 
Third Progress Report. 
The Governor-General has the power to appoint the Ministers of the 
Crown (Letters Patent, clause X) including the Prime Minister, although this is 
not specifically provided anywhere. By convention, the Governor-General will 
appoint the leader of the party or coalition that has the support of a majority of 
the House. John McGrath QC suggests:85 
. . . one area where it is well recognised that constitutional convention 
provides only limited guidance to the correct exercise of legal powers 
concerns the Governor-General's power to appoint the Prime Minister 
following a general election. Where it is unclear where the support of the 
new House of Representatives will lie, the Governor-General retains a 
discretion as to whom to appoint. 
However, Governor-General, Hardie Boys stated: 86 
in a parliamentary democracy such as ours, the exercise of the powers of 
my office must always be governed by the question of where the support 
of the House lies. If that is unclear, I am dependent on the political parties 
represented in the House to clarify that support, through political 
discussion and accommodation. 
84 
Constitution Review Group, above n 42. 
85 
John McGrath, QC "The Crown, the Parliament and the Government" (1999) 7 Waikato Law 
Review <www.knowledge-basket.co.nz> (last accessed 25 August 2006). 86 
Hardie Boys, above n 78 . 
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By convention, the Governor-General appoints as Prime Minister the 
person who can command a majority of the House. It has been suggested that 
under MMP, following an election, it will be more likely that it will not be 
clear who can command a majority of the House. Caroline Morris suggested 
that the Governor-General would need to use discretion in this situation to 
appoint a Prime Minister. 87 In reality, however, Sir Michael Hardie Boys made 
it clear that a Governor-General would wait for Parliament to sort it out. He 
referred to the Irish model, and said: 88 
In all of the countries examined, it is very clear that the real responsibility 
for forming a government rests with the political parties. That political 
parties provide this vital link between the democratic election process and 
the formation of a government has long been the case in New Zealand. 
MMP has made their importance more apparent. It is political parties 
which, through negotiation, must find a viable government in the 
Parliament. o-one else can arrive at the solution for them, or impose an 
outcome on them. 
Hence the question of how the Governor-General ascertains who to 
appoint as Prime Minister is not clear. The Irish Constitution removes any 
discretion from the President and places the issue in the hands of the Dail. In 
effect, this is what happens in New Zealand, as the Governor-General will 
only appoint as Prime Minister the person who can command the majority of 
the House. 
The Irish model would be suitable for New Zealand, as it is, by default, 
what happens anyway. There do not seem to be any problems associated with 
this model that could not arise under the current system. 
Currently, Parliament must be summoned within six weeks of the 
return of the writs after an election. 89 It has been pointed out, however, that 
this is not a legal constraint on the time taken to form a Government. In 
theory, it is argued, Parliament could assemble, MPs could be sworn in, the 
Speaker appointed, "and then the House could adjourn with the issue of who 
87 
Caroline Morris "The Governor-General, the Reserve Powers, Parliament and MMP: A ew Era" 
(1995) 25 VUWLR 345,354. 
88 
Rt Hon Sir Michael Hardie Boys "The Harkness Henry Lecture: Continuity and Change: The 1996 
General Election and the Role of the Governor-General" (1997) 5 Waikato LR. 89 
Constitution Act 1986, s 19. 
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will form the next government being left until some other occasion". 90 
However, this has never happened. The requirement to meet within a certain 
period of time provides a timeframe that political parties work towards in 
forming a Government. There is no such provision in the Irish Constitution. 
However, it would seem sensible to retain this requirement if the Irish model 
were to be followed in New Zealand. This requirement tends to prevent a 
defeated Government continuing in office in a caretaker role for any 
protracted period of time. Under the Irish model, the Government could not be 
formed until Parliament had been summoned but, if it was clear who would 
command a majority of the House, Parliament could be summoned 
immediately. In the Irish model, the outgoing Taoiseach must advise the 
President to summon the Dail as the outgoing Taoiseach remains in office 
until the Dail has nominated a new Taoiseach and the President has formally 
appointed them. The requirement that Parliament be summoned within six 
weeks of the return of the writs would also prevent the (unlikely) situation 
where a defeated Prime Minister did not advise the President to summon 
Parliament even though a new Government could be formed. 
1 The 2005 election - New Zealand 
Following the 2005 election, it was not immediately clear who would 
be able to form a Government. The provisional results indicated that Labour 
held 50 of the 122 seats, while National held 49. Based on these results it was 
possible that National could have formed a Government in a coalition or 
supply agreement with New Zealand First (seven seats), and a combination of 
the Maori Party (four seats), United Future (three seats) and ACT New 
Zealand (two seats). With only one seat less than Labour, it seemed possible 
that National could have formed a Government. However, the final results 
showed National only had 48 seats, and the total number of seats was 121. 
Labour held 50 seats, with Jim Anderton's Wigram seat bringing the total to 
51. The final results were not available until 18 October 2005, although the 
election occurred on 1 7 September. The last day for the return of the writs was 
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6 October, meaning there were six weeks from that date for Parliament to sit. 
Parliament was opened on 7 November. Even in this tight timeframe, with 
complex negotiations among a large number of parties, the parties managed to 
complete negotiations and reach agreement within a matter of weeks, allowing 
Parliament to open within the six-week timeframe and a Prime Minister to be 
appointed. 
D Codification of the Reserve Powers 
The Irish system is based entirely on a written Constitution. New 
Zealand's system is based on a hybrid of convention and law. Arguments have 
been made both for and against the possibility of codification of the Governor-
General's reserve powers. Evatt argued that codification would provide 
certainty.
91 
This view has been supported by George Winterton. 92 However, 
Quentin Baxter suggests that codification of the reserve powers is impossible. 
He suggested a Parliamentary resolution instead. 93 
One of the main arguments against codification seems to be that if the 
powers are set down in writing, they become justicible. Caroline Morris 
suggested that: 94 
The effects of codification are ... questionable. From a strict separation of 
powers viewpoint it does not seem desirable to have political questions of 
the highly sensitive nature which the Governor-General seeks to answer 
when she exercises the reserve powers to become the province of the 
judiciary. 
The case most often cited in this context is Adegbenro v Akintola.95 In that 
case, the Governor of Nigeria dismissed the Premier on the basis of a letter 
signed by a majority of the members of the House. The Constitution stated 
"the Governor shall not remove the Premier from office unless it appears to 
91 
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him that the Premier no longer commands the support of the majority of the 
members of the house of Assembly". It was argued that the Constitution 
intended to embody the convention followed in the United Kingdom that 
support should be judged on the basis of a vote in the House. The Privy 
Council, however, interpreted the meaning of the words in the Constitution, 
and held that those words overrode any convention. On the basis of the words 
of the Constitution, the Governor had not acted unconstitutionally. This case is 
held up as a demonstration of the danger of codifying the powers, as they then 
become subject to principles of statutory interpretation, which are not suited to 
discussions of these important reserve powers. Professor Quentin Baxter 
argues "there is a high risk that the convention will suffer a deformity in the 
course of transcription, or lose its ambience when judicially interpreted". 96 
However, it is not true to say that codification leads automatically to 
the judicial examination of the powers. In Ireland: 97 
the President shall not be answerable to either House of the Oireachtas or 
to any court for the exercise and performance of the powers and functions 
of his office or for any act done or purporting to be done by him in the 
exercise and performance of these powers and function. 
Therefore, the Courts will not examine the meaning of the words of the 
Constitution in relation to the President's powers. The President is not 
accountable to the Courts or to the Legislature, but is accountable to the 
electorate (at least, if the President intends to stand for a second term). If the 
Irish presidential model were followed in New Zealand, it seems that it would 
be wise to keep the exercise of the President's powers out of the realms of the 
Courts. 
The other argument against codification is that as "convention implies 
a true consensus, it is seen to be changeable only by another consensus".98 
This argument is also addressed to some extent by the Irish model. The 
President's powers are set out in the Constitution. The Constitution can only 
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be amended by referendum of the people at which one-third of the registered 
voters vote. 
99 
Therefore, if the powers of the President were to be changed, 
that could only be achieved by a majority of the registered voters voting for it. 
Although this does not produce absolute consensus, it is closer to a consensus 
than if these powers could be amended by Act of Parliament. 
Therefore, if the Irish model were to be followed in New Zealand, it 
may be advisable to have a written Constitution that is not an Act of 
Parliament and that can only be amended by referendum, as they have in 
Ireland. It is not clear that this is legally possible. The Republic of Ireland was 
able to pass the Constitution in the way that it did because, as a newly 
independent state, there was a "clean slate" that allowed the framers of the 
Constitution to enact the Constitution as they wished. It is unlikely that New 
Zealand could find an opportunity to simply follow this example. 
However, the enactment of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa may provide a model for New Zealand. That Constitution was 
developed by the National Assembly and the Senate, sitting jointly for the 
purpose, and called the Constitutional Assembly.100 The Constitution was sent 
to the Constitutional Court for consideration against constitutional principles 
and then referred back the Constitutional Assembly for reconsideration. A 
two-thirds majority of the Assembly was required to pass the Constitution. 
New Zealand could follow this example, with the Legislature sitting as a 
Constitutional Assembly, therefore avoiding the Constitution being an Act of 
Parliament. It seems advisable, however, that a New Zealand Constitution 
should be approved by the people in a referendum. This would require an 
extensive information campaign and would be an expensive process. 
However, it seems justifiable to expend considerable amounts of money to 
ensure such an important issue is understood and agreed to by the people. 
99 Articles 46, 4 7. 
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E President's Power to Refer Bills to the Supreme Court 
Article 26 states that the President, after consultation with the Council 
of State, may refer a Bill to the Supreme Court for review before he or she 
signs the Bill into law. If a Bill is referred to the Supreme Court for review, 
and the Supreme Court finds that any provision in it is repugnant to the 
Constitution, the President must decline to sign the Bill. This means that, if 
any provision is found repugnant, the whole Bill fails and the President may 
not sign it. The constitutionality of any Bill signed following a referral may 
not be subsequently challenged in the Courts (Article 34.3.3). 
The Supreme Court may not review financial Bills, as these are 
considered the exclusive domain of the Government. 
This power has been used 15 times, and on seven occasions the Bills 
have been found repugnant to the Constitution. This is obviously a significant 
power, and the only power of the President to be used with any regularity. IOI 
The most recent example of the use of this power was in relation to the Health 
Amendment (No 2) Amendment Bill 2004. This Bill was an amendment to the 
Health Act 1970 concerning the payment of certain charges. One of the 
objects of the Bill was to declare lawful certain charges for out-patient 
services imposed in the past, for which there had been no lawful authority, and 
for charges imposed for certain in-patient services that the legislature had 
declared should be free. The Supreme Court made it clear that, in line with the 
presumption of constitutionality principle, the Court should interpret the Bill 
so as to bring it into harmony with the Constitution. However, the right to 
recover money that had been unlawfully charged was a property right under 
101 
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the constitution and is protected by Articles 43 and 40.3.2. Therefore, the 
retrospective provisions of the Bill were found to be repugnant to the 
Constitution. 102 
1 Judicial appointments 
The Judges of the Supreme Court, the High Court and all other Courts 
are appointed by the President. 103 However, in exercising this function, the 
President must act only on the advice of the Government. 104 The independence 
of the Judiciary is aided by protection of remuneration. 105 Supreme Court 
Judges can only be removed for stated misbehaviour or incapacity, and then 
only upon resolutions being passed by the Dail and the Seanad calling for their 
removal.
106 
The independence of the Judiciary is especially important where 
they are given the power to review legislation. However, it is arguable that the 
Government appointing the Judges who are to consider government legislation 
is not an ideal situation. Again, however, no specific issues seem to have 
arisen to call into question the independence of the Judiciary. 
2 Supremacy of the Constitution v supremacy of Parliament 
In New Zealand, Parliament is generally considered to be supreme. 
Section 3(2) of the Supreme Court Act 2003 provides that "[n]othing in this 
Act affects New Zealand's continuing commitment to the rule of law and the 
sovereignty of Parliament". The notion of parliamentary sovereignty was 
described by Dicey: 107 
The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means nothing more nor less 
than this, namely, that parliament thus defined has, under the English 
constitution the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and further, 
that no person or body is recognised by the law as having a right to 
override or set aside the legislation of Parliament. 
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In recent years, a number of commentators have questioned this 
doctrine. Joseph argued: 108 
Parliamentary sovereignty is a latter-day myth perpetrated by our habits of 
lazy thinking. Parliament has never been sovereign. 
Lord Cooke of Thorndon observed "[t]he legislative and judicial 
functions are complementary; the supremacism of either has no place". 109 The 
Chief Justice, Dame Sian Elias, put it thus "Parliament is supreme as 
legislator. But it legislates under the law of the constitution". 110 
In all discussions about the constitutional arrangements of New 
Zealand, parliamentary sovereignty is held up as one of the vital tenants of our 
system. Any discussion of giving the Courts the power to invalidate legislation 
gives rise to the argument that parliamentary sovereignty would prevent such 
an arrangement. However, if one takes a step back, the question must be asked 
whether Parliamentary sovereignty is really fundamental to the ew Zealand 
system. Even if the Supreme Court Act 2003 makes it so, does that mean it 
should be? In Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review, 111 the Court of 
Appeal indicated that, in an appropriate case, it might make a declaration that 
a statutory limitation upon rights cannot be demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society and is in breach of the ew Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990.
112 
Sir Geoffrey Palmer points out that the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990, coupled with the common law powers that Courts have always 
exercised in New Zealand, grants the Courts a "weak form of judicial review" 
of legislative action.
113 
This weak form of judicial review is discussed by 
Mark Tushnet. He concludes: 11 4 
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Weak-form systems with legislators not committed to constitutional values 
might override judicial interventions too readily, re-establishing a system 
of parliamentary supremacy. Weak-form systems whose legislators believe 
that courts have a large advantage over them will defer to the courts' 
interpretation too often, transforming the system into one of strong-form 
review. 
The "weak form of judicial review" of legislative action 1s weak indeed. 
Where Parliament is considered sovereign, legislation can be made that may 
be considered to breach certain standards. However, the most the Courts can 
do is interpret the legislation consistently with the Bill of Rights. Parliament 
can then simply pass new legislation that makes it clear that the intention of 
the legislation was to breach that right, and therefore there is nothing the Court 
can do. It seems that there is no real safeguard against "unconstitutional" 
legislation. 
In Ireland, it is the Constitution itself that is supreme. In the course of 
his judgment in Byrne v Ireland, Budd J stated that: 115 
It is the people who are paramount . .. The State is not internally Sovereign 
but, in internal affairs, subject to the constitution, which limits, confines 
and restricts its powers. 
In re Article 26 and the Regulation of Information (Services outside the State 
for the Termination of Pregnancies) Bill 1995, Hamilton J stated "[t]he 
Constitution limits, confines and restricts the powers of the State and the 
organs of State established by the Constitution."116 
The Irish Constitution was not enacted as an Act of the Oireachtas. It 
was enacted in the same way as a Bill, but a motion was put to the House that 
the Constitution was "approved by the Dail". This draft Constitution was put 
to the plebiscite. The response was not overwhelmingly supportive. Only 38.6 
percent voted in favour, 29.6 percent voted against, and 31.8 percent abstained 
or spoiled their vote. 
117 
David Gwynn Morgan argues that any danger that this 
process, and therefore the Constitution, would be found to be invalid was 
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countered by Article 58, which provided that all Judges in office when the 
Constitution came into force could only remain in office if they took an oath to 
uphold the Constitution. 118 This process removes the power from the 
legislature to amend the Constitution, while legislation can be struck down by 
the Courts if found unconstitutional. 
3 The New Zealand Position 
In New Zealand, the Governor-General theoretically has the power to 
refuse to give assent to Bills. 119 Dame Silvia Cartwright stated: "I have the 
reserve power to refuse to assent to legislation, but that would be a major step 
to take".
120 
However, this power has never been used and it seems unlikely it 
ever would be.
12 1 
John McGrath suggested "If a Governor-General declined to 
assent to legislation, removal from office would generally be an available 
remedy". 122 
In the absence of a written Constitution, judicial review of legislation 
would require a standard against which the legislation could be measured. 
Paragraph 5.36 of the Cabinet Manual states: 
When a Bill is . . . submitted to the Cabinet Legislation Committee for 
approval for introduction, the Minister is required to confirm in the 
covering submission that the draft Bill complies with the legal principles 
and obligations identified in paragraph 5.35. 
The legal principles and obligations in paragraph 5.35 are: 
• the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi; 
• the rights and freedoms contained in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
or in the Human Rights Act 1993; 
• the principles in the Privacy Act 1993; 
• international obligations; 
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• the guidelines contained in the LAC Guidelines: Guidelines on Process and 
Content of Legislation, a publication of the Legislation Advisory Committee. 
Further, the Attorney-General is required to draw the attention of the 
House to any Bill that appears to be inconsistent with the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990. The Minister of Justice is responsible for examining all 
legislation for compliance with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and 
advising the Attorney-General. The Crown Law Office examines Bills 
developed by the Ministry of Justice. 123 
Therefore, there are standards that are supposed to be met for New 
Zealand legislation. However, there a number of factors that prevent these 
standards being a fully effective guard. First, Cabinet can approve legislation 
that does not conform to the standards. It may be politically unwise, but there 
is nothing to prevent them from doing so. Second, the Attorney-General need 
only "bring to the attention" of the House any inconsistency with the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Parliament may still pass the inconsistent 
legislation. In Mangawhero Enterprises v Attorney-General, it was found that 
if the Attorney-General fails to do this, nothing can be done. 124 Third, late 
amendments to Bills may not go through either of these vetting processes and 
inconsistencies with standards and the Bill of Rights may be introduced. After 
the legislation has been passed, there is little that can be done. The Courts 
must interpret legislation with Parliament's intention in mind. For example, if 
it is clear that Parliament intended to enact legislation that was inconsistent 
with the Bill of Rights, the Court must interpret it as so. Section 4 of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 makes the position clear: 
No court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether passed or made 
before or after the commencement of this Bill ofRights),-
(a) hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or 
revoked, or to be in any way invalid or ineffective; or 
(b) decline to apply any provision of the enactment-
by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision of this 
Bill of Rights. 
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Where there is ambiguity, however, the Courts must interpret legislation 
consistently with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Section 6 of that 
Act provides: "Wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is 
consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that 
meaning shall be preferred to any other meaning". 
4 A New Zealand model? 
The Irish model may be a step too far for New Zealand. Politicians are 
very unlikely to agree to giving the Courts a power to invalidate legislation 
duly passed by Parliament. However, it is clear that there are few real 
safeguards in the current process of enacting legislation. .,. 
Without giving a New Zealand President the power to refer Bills to the 
Supreme Court, a constitutional protection could be granted by allowing the 
President to refer back to Parliament Bills that do not, in the President's 
opinion, conform to stated standards. This would not involve the Courts but 
would be a final chance to bring to Parliament's attention provisions that may 
conflict with stated standards of constitutionality. 
If the President were to have this power, it would be important that he 
or she were elected, rather than appointed. It would be advisable that 
nomination were structured to ensure the Presidents had the requisite 
background to make such decisions. It would also be prudent that they had 
Counsel to advise on such issues. 
If New Zealand wishes to continue with the principle that Parliament's 
intention should be upheld by the Courts, this model would presumably be 
more acceptable. The President would not have a veto as such, as once a Bill 
was referred back, Parliament could still enact it. However, it would provide a 
constitutional protection that is not currently afforded by our current system. 
In many ways, this model would provide the advantages of the Irish 
President's power, without the danger of politicising the Judiciary. This model 
would presumably be more acceptable to politicians than the Irish model. 
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F Other Powers of the President 
1 Article 13.2.3 
Article 13.2.3 allows the President, after consultation with the Council 
of State, to convene either the Dail or the Seanad or both Houses of the 
Oireachtas. This has occurred once, in 1969, when President de Valera 
convened a meeting of both Houses to address them on the fiftieth anniversary 
of the inaugural meeting of the first Dail. This power could be used to convene 
the Dail to ascertain where the support of the House lay where the Taoiseach 
had requested a dissolution. 
2 Articles 22.2 and 24.1 
Article 22.2 allows the President to appoint a committee of privileges 
to decide whether a Bill is a money Bill or not. 125 This can only happen where 
the Seanad refers a question to the President. This provision seems not to have 
been used. Article 24.1 allows the Government to restrict the amount of time 
the Seanad has to consider a Bill, with the agreement of the President. Again 
this seems never to have been used. 
3 Article 27 
Article 27 only comes into effect on the operation of Article 23. Article 
23 allows a Bill passed by the Dail that the Seanad rejects or that the Seanad 
passes with amendments to which the Dail does not agree, or a Bill that is 
neither rejected nor passed within ninety days by the Seanad, to be enacted 
into law by resolution in the Dail. If this occurs, Article 27.1 provides that a 
majority of the Senators and one-third of the Deputies may petition the 
President to decline to sign the Bill. 126 Article 27.4 provides that the President 
can decide, at his or her own discretion, after consultation with the Council of 
125 
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State, 127 whether the Bill "contains a proposal of such national importance that 
the will of the people ought to be ascertained". If the President considers this 
to be so, the Bill must not be signed unless it is approved by a majority in a 
referendum in which one-third of the registered voters cast a vote or there is a 
general election and the new Dail passes a resolution approving the proposal. 
Whichever of these events result, they must occur within 18 months of the 
President's decision. This could be a fairly significant power, but its use 
depends on Article 23 being used, and a petition being brought to the President 
- neither of which appear to have occurred. 
The reference of Bills to the people where the subject matter is 
considered "of national importance" could be a useful model for New Zealand. 
As discussed above, the President could be given a power to refer Bills back to 
the House for consideration where certain standards were not met. 128 It may be 
that the President should also have a power to refer Bills to the people for 
consideration in appropriate circumstances. Article 27 only applies in very 
particular circumstances, which would not be relevant in the New Zealand 
context (as this paper does not advocate the return to a bicameral legislature). 
However, the principle that some Acts of Parliament are of such national 
importance that they should be referred to the people may be incorporated into 
a New Zealand model. For example, if the President were to be given a power 
to refer Bills back to Parliament, and Parliament was able to simply pass the 
legislation again, it may be that the President could then refer the Bill to the 
people in appropriate circumstances. Another option would be to require 
Parliament to pass the Bill a second time with a special majority, as in the 
United States. However, this paper does not propose to discuss that model. 
127 The Council of State consists of: i) As ex-officio members: the Taoiseach, the Tanaiste (Deputy 
Prime Minister), the Chief Justice, the President of the High Court, the Chairman of Dail Eireann, the 
Chairman of Seanad Eireann, and the Attorney General. 
ii) Every person able and willing to act as a member of the Council of State who shall have held the 
office of President, or the office ofTaoiseach, or the office of Chief Justice, or the office of President 
of the Executive Council of Saorstat Eireann (the Irish Free State 1922-1937). 
iii) Such other persons, if any, as may be appointed by the President under this Article to be members 
of the Council of State. (Article 31.2) 
128 Above Part V E 4. 
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VI RESTRICTIONS ON THE PRESIDENT 
A Travel 
Article 12.9 provides "[t]he President shall not leave the State during 
his term of office save with the consent of the Government". This prohibition 
appears to include personal travel as well as official visits. When President 
Hillery was advised by doctors to take his dying daughter to a warmer climate, 
he needed the Government's permission. President Hillery also needed the 
Government's permission to sail his yacht outside Irish territorial waters. 129 In 
1991, Mary Robinson visited Belfast in orthern Ireland. This caused some 
difficulty - it was unclear whether visiting Northern Ireland constituted 
leaving the State. If it did, that implied that Northern Ireland was a foreign 
country and, if not, the President could be seen as presenting herself as 
representing all the island's people. 130 The Government did not advise her not 
to go but the Tanaiste did inform her of the Government's concerns. 131 The 
visit went ahead and, in the course of the visit, the President shook hands with 
Gerry Adams, the leader of Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA. This 
action went against the Government's official policy towards Sinn Fein at that 
time, which included censorship in State broadcasting. There was a huge 
outcry. Former Minister of Justice, Patrick Cooney, said that the handshake 
had set back the day of reconciliation in the North and prejudiced her office 
and moral authority. 132 He suggested that the next time such a visit was 
proposed "the Government should have 'more bottle' and stop her from 
going". 133 In the end, this event blew over relatively quickly and may, in fact, 
have aided reconciliation. Three months later the Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds, 
shook Adams' hand, as did United States President Clinton. The following 
year, the IRA declared a ceasefire. After the declaration of the ceasefire, Mary 
Robinson was asked about shaking Adams' hand. She said: 134 
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It was a very difficult decision . .. In the difficulty, in the weighing it up, I underestimated what the media response would be afterwards . . . that creates a lot of pressure when you hold an office like mine because it's important that you don't get drawn into political controversy. 
It seems that such a provision would need to be clarified for the New Zealand 
context. It seems advisable that State and Official visits should require the 
consent of the Government. However, it seems unnecessary that private travel 
should be approved by the Government. If a President wished to travel to a 
State with which, for example, New Zealand did not currently have diplomatic 
relations, it would be very unwise for the President to travel there. However, it 
seems preferable to rely on the President's discretion in these matters than to 
put such strong formal restrictions on their personal activities. 
B Right to Speak 
Article 13.7 states: 
1 The President may, after consultation with the Council of State, communicate with the Houses of the Oireachtas by message or address on any matter of national or public importance. 
2 The President may, after consultation with the Council of State, address a message to the Nation at any time on any such matter. 
3 Every such message or address must, however, have received the approval of the Government. 
It is unclear whether restrictions apply to all speeches given by Presidents. It 
has been suggested that, technically, only two addresses to the Oireachtas and 
a handful of speeches to the nation have been made and that every other 
speech by a President does not require prior approval. 135 However, it is clear 
that Governments have not shared that view. There were tensions between 
President Robinson and Taoiseach Charles Haughey throughout the time that 
they were both in office. When President Robinson recorded a message for 
Irish-Americans at Saint Patrick's Day dinners in the United States, Haughey 
responded by sending a letter, accompanied by constitutional opinions of two 
former Attorneys General, referring to Article 13. 7. The opinions suggested 
that the President required approval from the Government for every address to 
the nation, including interviews. Robinson had given many interviews without 
135 Duffy, above n 38, 133. 
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consultation.
136 
Jim Duffy argues that the idea that all speeches of the 
President are subject to Government approval is based on the erroneous belief 
that the President's constitutional position is in some way akin to the position 
of the British Queen, whose every utterance is presumed to have been 
delivered with the approval of the Government. 137 
It seems that only speeches to Parliament, or official addresses to the 
nation should be subject to Government approval. As noted above, New 
Zealand Governors-General have made speeches on many issues in their role 
as symbolic head of the nation. If the President is elected on the basis of their 
"theme", it seems preferable that a President should be allowed to make 
speeches on issues that they consider important. 
VII CONCLUSION 
New Zealand will, almost inevitably, become a republic at some point 
in the future. At that time, it will be necessary to put in place a constitution in 
which the Governor-General is replaced by another form of Head of State. The 
Irish Presidential model seems to be a suitable model on which New Zealand 
could base its constitutional development. However, some modifications 
should be made to the Irish model, based on lessons learnt in Ireland and some 
fundamental differences in New Zealand's political culture and society. 
The role of Head of State is important as the "ceremonial 
personification of the State". In New Zealand, some Governors-General have 
been strong symbolic figures. This has been less true in Ireland until recently, 
but the experience of the last 20 years shows that the Presidential model can 
produce equally strong symbolic Presidents. Election of the Head of State 
would add to this role by giving the people the opportunity to elect the person 
they believe most represents their vision of New Zealand. Election also 
encourages the people to feel more connected to the symbol they have chosen. 
136 Siggins, above n 13 , 159. 
137 Duffy, above n 38. 
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The Irish model of presidential election has some flaws. By providing 
that there shall be no election where only one candidate is nominated, there 
have been relatively few presidential elections. This seems to defeat the 
purpose of directly electing the President. It is possible that in New Zealand 
there could, perhaps, be provision for a plebiscite on the single candidate as in 
Austria. However, the preferred solution would be a convention whereby 
Parliament is always required to nominate more than one candidate. 
There is a danger in that this convention may lead to the politicisation 
of the presidential election, as it is likely that the two major political parties 
would each put forward a candidate. However, Ireland's experience has shown 
that even a highly politicised election campaign may not lead to the 
politicisation of the office, as the importance of impartiality is well understood 
by all. The last two Irish Presidents have received extremely high approval 
ratings, despite the political affiliations that enabled their nominations. 
Ireland has considered the difficulty of nomination, with Review 
Groups suggesting provision should be made for popular nomination. This 
does not seem appropriate in New Zealand. It is very possible that great New 
Zealand "icons" could receive the required nominations and be elected, but 
would be likely to be unsuitable for the role. There is a certain amount of 
knowledge and experience required for the role, and it is important that the 
role remains a dignified one. Therefore, nomination by 20 members of 
Parliament is suggested, with a constitutional convention that more than one 
candidate will always be nominated. 
The Irish President has less discretionary power than the Governor-
General in regards to the appointment of Prime Ministers and the dissolution 
of Parliament. However, as has been shown, the reserve powers of the 
Governor-General are unclear and it may be that there is no more real power 
in the Governor-General's role. There is enough discretion left with the 
President to deal with political situations as they arise. The President can only 
refuse to dissolve the Dail when the Taoiseach has ceased to retain the 
majority of the support of the Dail. The Cook Islands example shows how 
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problematic this situation can be, and it is suggested that the New Zealand 
President should only refuse to dissolve Parliament when it is certain another 
Government could be formed. This is in reality the current New Zealand 
position. 
It seems that codification of the reserve powers in a way similar to the 
President's powers in the Irish Constitution may not solve all the issues in 
regards to those powers, but they do provide more certainty and do not seem 
to cause any more problems than are inherent in the discretionary reserve 
powers. Codification has long been believed to be inherently problematic. 
However, the Irish model provides a basis for codification that could work 
adequately in New Zealand. 
The President's ability to refer Bills to the Supreme Court provides a 
constitutional safeguard against abuse of parliamentary power. While 
accepting that it seems unlikely that a New Zealand Parliament would give up 
its supremacy in such a way, it does seem that giving a New Zealand President 
the power to refer Bills back to Parliament for reconsideration would be a 
positive step. There are currently no strong safeguards against abuse of power 
by the legislature. "Parliamentary supremacy" does not seem to provide an 
adequate argument against having these safeguards. The power of the 
President to refer Bills to the people in certain circumstances may also be a 
valuable model for New Zealand. 
If the Irish model were to be followed in New Zealand, it would be 
advisable to have a written Constitution that is not an Act of Parliament and 
that can only be amended by referendum, as is the case in Ireland. It is not 
clear that this is currently legally possible. However, the enactment of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa may provide a model for New 
Zealand, with Parliament sitting as a Constitutional Committee rather than as 
Parliament. It would be advisable that a New Zealand Constitution would also 
be approved by the people in a referendum. 
48 
Subject to the reservations outlined above, the Irish Presidential model 
could provide a basis on which a New Zealand model could be developed. 
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